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CASE NOTES
Court to pass on what is permissible conduct within freedom of press. By
stating "the courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will
protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences," 39 the Su-
preme Court is giving judicial approval to a trial court initiative in this
area. Whether the trial courts will provide an effective deterrent to prej-
udicial publicity is still conjectural. However, one must remember that
there are some desirable effects of criminal publicity. It is the watchdog of
the judicial system,40 and an effective weapon against corruption of
police, prosecutors, and other law enforcement personnel.41 Also, pre-
trial publicity reduces community anxiety where the arrest of key suspects
is made known to the public. 42 Though the Court has opened the door to
further restraints on the press, it remains to be seen to what extent a court
may actually curtail the dissemination of news.
Robert Kopple
39 Ibid.
40 Supra note 32; See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the first of the "Scotts-
boro Cases," where publicity insured ultimate justice for nine Negroes put on trial
in the South.
41 Jaffe, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 504, 512 (1965).
42 See CAPOTE, IN COLD BLOOD (1966), to illustrate arousal of anxiety in the community
where a sensational crime is unsolved.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LOYALTY OATH-SPECIFIC
INTENT REQUIRED FOR VALIDITY
Petitioner, a school teacher, refused to take the loyalty oath required
of all public officers and employees of the state of Arizona. The oath,
together with an accompanying statutory gloss,1 proscribed knowing
1ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. S 38-231(e) (Supp. 1965) reads as follows: "Any officer or
employee as defined in this section having taken the form of oath or affirmation pre-
scribed by this section, and knowingly or wilfully at the time of subscribing the oath
or affirmation, or at any time thereafter during his term of office or employment, does
commit or aid in the commission of any act to overthrow by force or violence the
government of this state or of any of its political subdivisions, or advocates the over-
throw by force or violence of the government of this state or of any of its political
subdivisions, or during such term of office or employment knowingly and wilfully be-
comes or remains a member of the communist party of the United States or its succes-
sors or any of its subordinate organizations or any other organization having for one
of its purposes the overthrow by force or violence of the government of the state of
Arizona or any of its political subdivisions, and said officer or employee as defined in
this section prior to becoming or remaining a member of such organization or organi-
zations had knowledge of said unlawful purpose of said organization or organizations,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be subject to all the
penalties for perjury; in addition, upon conviction under this section, the officer or
employee shall be deemed discharged from said office or employment and shall not be
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membership in the Communist Party or in any other organization which
advocated the violent overthrow of the government. Following her sum-
mary dismissal, petitioner sought to have the loyalty oath requirement
declared invalid. The statute was upheld in the trial court and on appeal
the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed. 2 On certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court the holding was reversed. The Court declared that
a statute which penalized mere knowing membership without requiring
a specific intent to further illegal designs, did violence to the commands
of the first amendment. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
The importance of the Elfbrandt decision is readily apparent in that it
represents a marked departure from the former rule that knowing mem-
bership in a subversive organization was sufficient to justify the rejection
of an applicant for a public position, or to warrant the discharge of those
already employed.8 A profound change has resulted through the require-
ment that a specific intent be shown in those cases where civil sanctions
alone are normally invoked. The Court has, in effect, embraced a require-
ment which has long obtained in the area of criminal anarchy, syndical-
ism, and subversion. 4
Basic to any meaningful understanding of Elfbrandt is a working knowl-
edge of those decisions of the High Court which deal with the subject
of loyalty. Considering first the fruitful area of criminal sanctions, per-
haps the most logical point of departure is viewed in the "clear and present
danger" doctrine enunciated by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United
States.5 Defendant was appealing his conviction under the Espionage Act 6
for attempting to cause insubordination in the armed forces of the United
States. Defendant's contention was that though his circulars might tend
to obstruct the draft, since he committed no act, but only spoke, this
conduct was protected by the first amendment. Though this might be
true in normal circumstances, it was held that the character of every act
must be judged according to the circumstances in which it was done.
Justice Holmes declared:
entitled to any additional compensation or any other emoluments or benefits which
may have been incident or appurtenant to said office or employment"
2 Elfbrandt v. Russell, 94 Ariz. 1, 381 P.2d 554 (1963). Judgment was vacated by the
Supreme Court, 378 U.S. 127 (1964), for reconsideration in light of Baggett v. Bullitt,
377 U.S. 360 (1964).
8 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
4 Civil loyalty oaths usually involve a major sanction of discharge or rejection from
public office or employment, but oftentimes include a minor sanction of perjury.
Criminal tests are those whose major sanction is incarceration and/or fine.
5 249 U.S. 49 (1919). See also Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs
v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
6 18 U.S.C. 1 2388 (1964).
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The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such cir-
cumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent.7
Here clear and present danger is seen as the test of speech where the
Espionage Act did not, in itself, designate what types of speech were
offensive.
But of even greater importance for the purposes of this analysis was
the Court's concern with the requirement of intent. For as the Court
stated: "If the act, (speaking or circulating a paper), its tendency and
the intent with which it is done are the same, we perceive no ground
for saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime."'8 In this,
the first important free speech case decided by the Supreme Court, intent
is included as a necessary prerequisite for conviction on the grounds of
disloyalty.
The Court again had occasion to examine this problem in the case of
Gitlow v. New York.9 Here the defendant was convicted for the statutory
crime of criminal anarchy' ° for publishing the "Left-Wing Manifesto,"
a Communist writing attacking capitalism and urging mass action against
the government. The Court rejected defendant's contention that the stat-
ute punished mere speech without regard to the likelihood of unlawful
substantive evil, holding that it was reasonable for a state to protect itself
from violent overthrow." The issue, according to the Court, was merely
whether the evidence showed a violation of the statute. Although the
Court did not apply the clear and present danger doctrine to the facts
of this case, intent was still viewed as a necessary ingredient of the crime,
for the Court charged the jury that they must determine the "intent,
purpose and fair meaning of the Manifesto."'12
In Whitney v. California'3 the defendant was appealing her conviction
under the Criminal Syndicalism Act.' 4 This action emanated from the
defendant's representation of the Communist Labor Party at its founding
convention. Notwithstanding the fact that a more radical platform was
adopted than that advanced by the defendant, she continued to represent
the party on two subsequent occasions. In defense, defendant contended
7 Schenck, supra note 5, at 52. 9 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
8 Ibid. 10 N.Y. PEN. LAW S§ 160-161 (1958).
11 The Court's holding was bottomed on the decision of Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905), where the reasonable man theory found acceptance. An excellent dis-
cussion of the reasonable man theory may be found in PRITCHETr, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND
THE VINSON COURT 28-32 (1954).
12 Gitlow, supra note 9, at 661.
18 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 1 4 CAL. PEN. CODE § 11400 (1963).
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that she could not be held responsible for the actions of the party since
she had advocated a less extreme platform. The Court thought otherwise,
holding that her continued membership was evidence of an intent to fur-
ther the aims of the party as they were advanced at its convention. Thus,
with Whitney, the Court seemed to say that it would question the statute
itself, only upon the grounds of its reasonableness.
Recognizing that the foregoing decisions were rendered during the
pre-war era, with the passage of the Smith Act, 15 the Court once more
was confronted with a statute that met head-on with the dictates of the
first amendment. Dennis v. United States'6 involved eleven leaders of the
Communist party who had been convicted of conspiring to teach or
advocate the overthrow of the government by force or violence. Reject-
ing the petitioners' contention that the Smith Act unconstitutionally in-
fringed upon first amendment freedoms, the Court, through Chief Justice
Vinson, adopted a further refinement of Holmes' clear and present danger
test. The Court thus accepted in toto the clear and probable danger test
which had been enunciated by Chief Judge Learned Hand in the Court
of Appeals. 17 The issue according to this eminent authority was "whether
the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.' 8 Although a
new rationale for upholding the loyalty test was thus forthcoming, the
Court still required the element of intent. Concerning this the Court again
stressed:
We hold that the statute requires as an essential element of the crime proof
of the intent of those who are charged with its violation to overthrow the
Government by force and violence .... The existence of a mens rea is the
rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal
jurisprudence. 19
Considering now the matter of civil loyalty oaths it is apparent that here
the law has evolved at a slower pace than that in the criminal area. Here
the cases have moved from a denouncement of mere membership, then to
knowing membership, and finally, with Elfbrandt, to membership with
the specific intent to further the organization's illegal aims.
The landmark case in which the United States Supreme Court first
considered civil loyalty oaths was American Communications Ass'n. v.
15 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964). 16 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
17Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 494
(1951).
1s Id. at 212. For more recent cases stressing the intent requirement see Noto v.
United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) and Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). In
these cases both the constitutionality of the statutes and the requirement of intent
continue to be upheld even if it had to be said that the intent was implied.
19 Dennis, supra note 14, at 499-500.
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Douds.20 In this case the petitioners refused to comply with that pro-
vision of Section 9 (h) of the Taft-Hartley Act2 ' which required that
union officers file a non-communist affidavit as a condition precedent to
receiving the benefits available under the Act. The Court rejected peti-
tioners' contention that the Act violated the guarantee of freedom of
association implied in the first amendment and held that through the
Interstate Commerce clause there was ample justification for Congress to
provide sanctions against "political strikes." In arriving at this conclusion
the Court's reasoning was somewhat analogous to that advanced in Dennis:
The fact that the injury to interstate commerce would be an accomplished fact
before any sanctions could be applied, the possibility that a large number of
such strikes might be called at a time of external or internal crisis, and the
practical difficulties which would be encountered in detecting illegal activities
of this kind are factors which are persuasive that Congress should not be
powerless to remove the threat, not limited to punishing the act.22
Though the Court in Douds did not seek to construe the term "mem-
bership," two years later the Court addressed itself to this problem in
Garner v. Board of Public Works.23 In a 5-4 decision it was held that
mere membership was not sufficient. What was required was "knowing
membership" since the element of scienter was implicit in the statutory
provision under consideration.
Adler v. Board of Education,24 which involved a statute requiring
"knowing membership" on behalf of public school employees, added
weight to Garner. Here the Court reiterated:
Past loyalty may have a reasonable relationship to the present and future
trust. Both are commonly inquired into in determining fitness for both high
and low positions in private industry and are not less relevant in public em-
ployment.235
The Court's consideration of civil loyalty oaths entered its second stage
of development in Wieman v. Updegraff.26 In this landmark case the
20 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
2161 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (1958). In essence the act required the
affiant to state that he did not believe in, and was not a member of or support any
organization that believed in or taught the overthrow of the government by force or
by any illegal or unconstitutional methods.
22 Douds, supra note 20, at 406.
23 341 U.S. 716 (1951). 24 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
25 Garner, supra note 23, at 720. The Court summarily rejected petitioner's contention
that the right of freedom of association was impaired holding that one could join any
group he wished by simply resigning from his public position. However, in Torcaso
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), this concept was rejected, the Court holding that
merely because a person is not compelled to hold public office cannot be an excuse for
barring him on associational grounds.
26 Supra note 3.
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Supreme Court for the first time declared a contested oath unconstitu-
tional, unanimously holding that the absence of scienter created a con-
clusive presumption of disloyalty by mere association and amounted to
an indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity.
Aptheker v. Secretary of State,27 again stressed the unconstitutionality
of prohibiting both knowing and unknowing membership. But this case
also stresses that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broad and thereby invade the area of pro-
tected freedoms.
In the case of Baggett v. Bullitt,2 8 the petitioner attacked an oath re-
quiring employees of the University of Washington to swear they were
not "subversive persons." A "subversive person" was defined as one who
commits or attempts to commit, or aids, advocates, advises, or teaches the
violent overthrow of the government. In declaring the oath unconstitu-
tional the Court again turned to the scienter requirement holding that the
act unjustly punished guiltless knowing behavior.29 Thus, in essence, the
Court was implying that a specific intent must be coupled with knowing
membership to protect the guiltless knowing member.
Finally, in Elfbrandt, the Court explicitly embraced the specific intent
requirement which had been implied in Baggett. Knowing membership
was not sufficient to bring public employees within the purview of the
statute. It was reasoned that:
Laws such as this which are not restricted in scope to those who join with
the 'specific intent' to further illegal action impose, in effect, a conclusive
presumption that the member shares the unlawful aims of the organization.80
Thus it is apparent that with the holding in the case at bar the status
of the law concerning loyalty oaths has reached the position that has
long obtained in the criminal subversion area. Criminal jurisprudence has
always recognized the necessity of a mens rea, but, Elfbrandt today ex-
tends this requirement to the civil loyalty oath.
The real implications of Elfbrandt have yet to be seen in light of those
jurisdictions which have similar oath requirements. Whether the instant
case will give impetus to additional litigation will be determined in the
future.81 It is uniformly recognized that when dealing with first amend-
27 378 U.S. 500 (1964). 28 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
29 Morris, Baggett v. Bullitt and Guiltless Knowing Behavior, 1 LAW TRANS. Q. 185
(1964).
30 Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 17 (1966).
31 For example, in Illinois the scope of the loyalty oath requirement extends at this
time to mere knowing membership. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, S 166 (b) (1965).
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ment freedoms the courts should strive to maintain the balance between
individual rights and the rights of society. The thought which remains is
whether a literal adherence to the dictates of Elfbrandt will tip the scale
too heavily in favor of the individual at the expense of the public.
Hugo Scala
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MERE EVIDENCE RULE
AS A CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
Defendant, a California physician, treated a number of patients whose
medical care was paid for by the Bureau of Public Assistance of Los
Angeles County. In order to receive compensation for such services, the
physician was required to submit medical care statements certifying that
he had performed the services described and that the amount due for such
services had not been paid. Defendant had been submitting fraudulent
statements to the Bureau and was convicted in the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, for violating Sec. 72 of the Penal Code of California.' At
the trial, the state introduced certain of the doctor's medical files which
proved that many of the services billed to the Bureau had never been
rendered. These files had been seized under a valid search warrant. De-
fendant appealed, contending that the seizure of the records and their use
in evidence was a denial of the constitutional protection of the fourth,2
fifth,3 and fourteenth amendments 4 of the Constitution of the United
States. This contention was based upon the theory that the so-called
"mere evidence" rule enunciated by the United States Supreme Court, un-
der which objects of merely evidentiary value may not be seized in any
manner, 5 is binding upon the states under the decision in Mapp v. Ohio.6
I CAL. PEN. CODE § 72 (West 1927).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
3 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself. .. "
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; ...
5 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298 (1921).
6 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
